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Disabled Patrons of Amusement Parks: A
Survey of Legal Issues
by SUSAN E. MORTON*

I
Introduction
A trip to an amusement park has come to be a regular summer outing for many American families. Walt Disney World in
Lake Buena Vista, Florida, led the industry in attendance in
2
1984 with 22 million guests,' many of whom were disabled
Although industry statistics show that North American amusement parks had a combined 1984 attendance of over 100 million
visitors, s the number of disabled visitors is not easy to calculate.' Applying expert estimates that one in every ten Ameri* BS.Ed, California University of Pennsylvania, 1974; MA. , West Virginia
University, 1977; B.S., Salem (West Virginia) College, 1982; J.D., West Virginia University College of Law, 1985. The author is currently a member of the International
Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions and of the National Recreation and
Park Association.

L 1984 Season Spotty for Top 40 Amusement Parks, Amusement Bus., Dec. 29,
1984, at 65, coL 1 [hereinafter cited as 1984 Season].
2. There is some debate whether the term "disabled" or 'handicapped" is less

stigmatizing. Although "handicapped" is most often used in statutes and regulations,
"disability" is used throughout this note. Most statutes use the standard federal definition of "handicapped," which includes "any person who (1) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment." § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 41 C.F.R. § 6-741.2 (1984).
Many park professionals, however, use a less formal definition of "handicapped,"
which includes persons with conditions aggravated by ride forces (such as pregnancy,

heart conditions, bad backs, and osteoporosis), unusual physical conditions (such as
excessive weight, extreme height, or extreme body proportion), or physical or mental
impairment. Speech by James Prager, International Association of Amusement
Parks and Attractions Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA. (Nov. 17,1983), reported
in Amusement Bus., Dec. 10, 1983, at 14, col 4. For a discussion of the "disabled"/
"handicapped" semantic question, see THE LEGAL RiGHrs OF HANDICAPPED PERSONs

4-6 (R. Burgdorf, Jr., ed. 1980); L. RoTHMTN, RIGHTS OF PHYSCALLY HANDICAPPED

PInsONS 2 (1984).
3. 1984 Season, aupru note 1, at 65.
4. This difficulty in calculation is illustrated by the experience of Cedar Point in
Sandusky, Ohio. Of the 2.7 million visitors to the park in 1983, only 7000 disabled
guests visited the park office to arrange for admission to rides. There is no way to
determine, however, how many disabled persons came to the park for the shows,
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can children has an appreciable physical or mental disability,5
one can reasonably conclude that several million visitors to
these parks each year are disabled.
It is no accident that increasing numbers of disabled patrons
are visiting amusement parks each year. The effort to provide
them access is gaining support throughout the amusement park
industry.' A decline in the number of persons In the traditional
teenage market for amusement parks 7 has caused many parks
to look for ways to broaden their appeal to non-traditional visitors such as the elderly8 and the disabled.
Not only has the amusement park industry discovered its disabled patrons, but the disabled have discovered the industry.
With more disabled people living independently and becoming
increasingly mobile, more of their attention has turned to vacation, travel and entertainment.' Industry accommodation to
their special needs has been especially welcome, given the 1978
estimate by one advocate for the disabled that ninety percent of
all public recreation facilities were previously inaccessible to
the disabled.10 Calling the right to recreation "the last battle,"
he concluded that the final dimension in equal rights for the
disabled was "to convince people of the rightness and necessity
of equal opportunity in recreation.""
This note addresses the three legal issues most important to
the successful integration of disabled patrons into amusement
parks: admittance, accommodation, and safety. Specifically,
this note examines the statutory and common law bases mandating both admission of disabled patrons and corresponding
accommodation of facilities. Ride safety is discussed, in light of
beach, restaurants, and other experiences but were not interested in actively participating in rides. Telephone interview with Jack Falfas, Director of Park Operations,
Cedar Point, Sandusky, Ohio (Mar. 30, 1963).
& Golden Anniversary White House Conference on Children and Youth, Conference Proceedings 255 (1960), quoted in J. POMEROY, REcREATON FOR THE PH=S!CALLY HANDICAPPED 5 (1964).

6. Amusement Bus., De. 31, 1983, at 50, col. L
7. Rosebaugh, Fountain of Youth Discovered, COURIER, Nov. 1984.
& IS Rosebaugh mentions special "senior citizen" promotions highlighting food
and entertainment rather than thrill rides as examples of this trend toward wider
appeal of amusement parks.
9. Selwyn, Dealingwith HandicappedConsumem Added Riska and Obligations,
TRIAL, Jan. 1982, at 64.

10. Recreatkm. The Final Dineuon in Equal Opportunity for the Handi.

capped-An Interview with John A. Neabitt,AMICUs, May-June 1978, at 32,34 [hereinafter cited as Recreation]. See also L.RanSTI, upr, note 2, at 202-03.
11. Recreation, supra note 10, at 37.
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public policy considerations that should be examined by park
management when establishing a ride access policy for the disabled, and by lawmakers considering legislation or regulation

in this area.

II.
Park Admittance
A.

State Statutes Regulating Park Admittance
of Disabled Individuals

Because, most amusement parks are privately owned, they
are not governed by federal law prohibiting access discrimination against disabled individuals.12 Instead, antidiscrimination
regulation is determined by state law. Forty-one states now
have statutes which prohibit such discrimination by privatelyowned recreation facilities, although these statutes vary
18
widely.
State statutory schemes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability can be divided into three categories. 14 Eighteen
states have a "comprehensive" civil rights statute which both
protects against discrimination in several areas, including housing and employment, and provides for specialized administrative and enforcement mechanisms. These comprehensive
statutes cover privately-owned public accommodations including recreation facilities open to the public." Other states have
12. There is little federal protection for the disabled in this area. The United
States Supreme Court has not yet held that they are a suspect class for the purposes
of federal equal protection analysis. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History Qf Unequal

Treatment- The Qualifications f HandicappedPersom as a "Suspect Class" Under
the Equal PrOte tUn C!ause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975).
Although § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled, the coverage is limited to programs and activities directly receiving federal ftnancial assistance. See 29 U.S.C.§ 794 (1981), construed in Simpson v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex.
1977), qf'd, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 449 US. 889 (1982).
For a general discussion of the failure of federal law in this area and the efforts
made by state legislatures to provide a more viable avenue for disabled persons seeking access to public and private facilities, see IL ROTHSEmn,
up note 2, at 154.
13. 1 B. SALES, D. PowELL, R. VAN DUxAD & ASSOcMATE DIABLED PERSONS
AND THE LAw: STATE LEGISLATrvE IssUS 151 (1982).
14. For a thorough discussion of these categories, as well as suggested model legislatlon, seeid at 151-7L
15. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-801,802 (1982 Repl. Vol); FLA. STAT. § 413.08 (West
Supp. 1983); IND. CODL ANN. §§ 22-9-1-2 -3 (Burns 1974 & Supm. 1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 601A.1, .Z .7 (West 195); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 337, §§ 4551, 4552
(1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §5 (1979 RepL VoL);
c. COMa. LAws ANN.
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chosen not to adopt a comprehensive statute, but instead have
enacted a series of several statutes, each limited in coverage to
one issue, such as employment discrimination.' Sixteen states
have adopted "limited coverage" statutes applicable to privately-owned public accommodations. 11 Finally, twenty-four
states have general nondiscrimination statutes designed to provide equal access to public streets and facilities. s Although not
applicable to privately-owned amusement parks, these statutes
apply to publicly-funded recreation areas such as municipal
parks.
§§ 37.1301, .1302 (1978 Rev. Vol. & Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West
Supp. 1984); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 354-A8

(West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 10:5-4. -41 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (MeKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1983-1984); OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1983-1984); Op. REV.
STAT. §§ 659.405, .425 (1983 Repl. Part); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.43, § 955 (Purdon 1964 &

Supp. 1983-1984); R.. GEN. LAwS §§ 42-87-1, -2 (1983 Supp.); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE art.
4419e (1980 & West Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (Supp. 1984-1985); W.
VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (West Supp. 1983).
16. See B. SALES, supra note 13, at 151.
17. ALA. CODE § 21-7-3 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.06.020(b), 47.80.010 (1979);
AiK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2902 (1979 RepL VoL); CAL. CirV. CODE § 54.1 (Deering Supp.

1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (previous version specifically
included "amusement and recreation parks," § 53-35 (1949)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 9502(b) (1981 RepL Vol.); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1702 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 56-703
(1976); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3363 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1009(c) (1981 Repl. Vol.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1952(B) (West 1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-8-5 (1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 314.010 (Vernon 1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 20-127(2) (West Supp. 1982); NEv. REV. STAT. § 651.070 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 287-3(A) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-3 (1982 Repl. Vol.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-20(B)
(Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFED LAws ANN. § 20-13-23.1 (1979 Rev.); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-30-1(2) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 42-1-126 (1977).

18. In most instances these statutes were originally known as 'White Cane Safety
Acts," and had been designed and enacted to prohibit discrimination against the blind.
Most were amended later to include other physical disabilities. B. SALES, supra note
13, at 224.
Many states have both these and other antidiscrimination statutes. For lists of
other antidiscrimination statutes, see supra notes 15 & 17. The states with White
Cane Laws are: AlA. CODE § 21-7-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 18.06.020(a) (1979); ARz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-411(A) (1983); AP.. STAT. ANN. § 82-2902 (1979 Repl Vol.); CAl.
Civ. CODE § 54 (Deering 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9502(a) (1983 RepL VoL);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1701 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 56-702 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 3361 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-5.1 (Burns Supp. 1983);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1952(A) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1311
(West 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 30, § 33(c) (1983 Repl. Vol.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-65 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-211(1) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-127(1) (West
Supp. 1982); NEv. REV. STAT. § 426.005 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167-C (1977);
NML STAT. ANN. § 28-7-3 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4333-20 (Law. Co-op. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-30 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 5-15 (1984)
(blind and deaf only); WYo. STAT.. § 42-1-126 (1977). Note: This list contains only
those White Cane Laws with antidiscriminain provisions.
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Where they exist, antidiscrimination statutes are probably
the most effective sources for enforcement of the rights of the
disabled to amusement park admission.1 9 Suits under such statutes have been effective where the discrimination is based on
such speculative claims as the owner's fear that other patrons
would be upset by the presence of a disabled person.20 For example, California's public accommodation statute was the basis
for three suits in which wheelchair users allegedly encountered
attitudinal barriers in attempting to enter restaurants.-" One

plaintiff was told he would be served only if he moved to an
isolated table. Two other plaintiffs were refused service entirely; one was told his presence was "too disturbing," and the
other was told the restaurant did not "serve wheelchairs."' '
Although the three cases were settled within two years after
they were first brought,23 they serve as excellent examples of
the potential reach of the statute.
Similarly, discriminatory treatment cannot be justified on
speculative safety grounds.2 In DeFini v. Home Lines Agency,

Inc. ,2 two blind persons successfully sued a vacation travel
agency which refused them passage on a ship because the ship's
policy excluded blind persons as passengers unless they were
accompanied by a sighted escort. In construing the New York
Human Rights Law,w the Commissioner of the State Division
19. Suits based on antidiscrimination statutes were successfully brought against
amusement parks that practiced racial segregation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Auburn &
Syracuse Elec. R.R., 222 N.Y. 443,119 N.E. 72 (1918); Fletcher v. Coney Island, 54 Ohio
Op. 112,121 NXE.2d 574 (1954), rev'd on issue Qf injunction only, 165 Ohio St. 150,134
N.E.2d 371 (1956); Commonwealth v. Figari, 166 Pa. Super. 169,70 A2d 666 (1950). See
also Jacques, Segregation in Amusement Parks-Separate but not Equal (PartI),
AmusEmmNT PARK J., Dec. 1984, at 13; Jacques, Integration-AmusementParks Solve
a Thorny Issue (PartII), AMusE.xET PARK J., Jan. 1985, at 13.
20. Murtaugh, The Right to Recreation. A Review qf Legal Action, Abacus, May.
June 1978, at 46, 47.
21. Ramsey v. Rinehart, No. 500186-8 (Sup. Ct. Alameda Co., Cal., 1977); Winter v.
Mayflower Restaurant, No. 500188-6 (Sup. CL Alameda Co., Cal., 1977); Zarzueta v.
Yenching Restaurant, No. 500187-7 (Sup. CL Alameda Co., Cal., 1977).
22. Murtaugh, aupra note 20.
23. Telephone interview with Robert Funk, Esq., Disability Rights Office, Berke.
ley, CaL (Mar. 14, 1984).
24. This is not to say that refusing admission to certain rides for verifiable safety
reasons may never be valid and not discriminatory. These considerations are dis.
cussed ftfr in text accompanying notes 102-195.
25. CPD-8522-75 (N.Y. Exec. Dept., Div. of Human Rights, 1976).
26. N.Y. EXzc. LAW § 296(2)(a) provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the
owner ... of any place of public acommodation, resort or amusement, be.
cause of the... disability... of any person, directly or indirectly, to re.
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of Human Rights found that the ship was recognized by the law
as a "place of public accommodation," and discrimintion in
passage was, therefore, unlawful. 2 One commentator has
noted that discrimination against the blind patrons was not justified by the ship's fear of being "responsible" for their safety,s
since most disabled persons are able to care for themselves with
little or no assistance and in most circumstances are no more of
a safety hazard than anyone else.
The holding in the DeFni case and the purpose and language
of the antidiscriminatory statutes indicate that a blanket policy
of refusing disabled patrons admission to the park itself, or to
park restaurants, theatres, and similar facilities, if based on the
speculative fears of being responsible for their safety or of upsetting other park patrons, would be unlawful discrimination.
B. Common Law Remedies for Blatant Discrimination
Even in jurisdictions lacking applicable antidiscrimination
statutes, the discriminatory treatment may give rise to an independent cause of action in tort for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' Although this cause of action is rarely
found to exist where the perpetrator of a less-than-extreme indignityS is a mere proprietor and not a common carrier,-" two
cases in which this cause of action was extended beyond common carriers concerned amusement parks.? In Davis v. Tafuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities or privileges thereof ....
27. DeRni, CPD38522-75.
28. Murtaugh, supra note 20, at 48. See also Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, 519
F. Supp. U73 (D.D.C. 1981) (airline cannot categorically discriminate against the disabled without a specific showing of safety concern).
29. The three wheelchair discrimination cases cited 8upmsnote 21 were brought
jointly under this theory and the California Civil Rights Act. Because the cases were
settled out of court, it is difficult to determine the degree to which each individual
theory of Ilability was persuasive.
30. The owners of premises open to the public can be held liable for extreme outrage. See Interstate Amusement Co. v. Martin, 8 AL App. 481, 62 So. 404 (1913)
(plaintiff publicly humiliated on theatre stage); Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon,
180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938) (schoolgirl accused of Indecent conduct and threatened
with arrest); Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 3, 185 S.W.692 (1916) (insult
and abuse).
31. Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Self, 192 Ala 403, 68 So. 328 (1915); Wallace v.
Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (Mun. App. D.C. 1948); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores,
100 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1958); Miller v. Friedman's Jewelers, 107 Ga. App. 841, 131 S.E.2d
663 (196); Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C.392, 3 SZ.Ed 38 (1939).
32. One possible reason for the extension of this higher standard to amusement
parks may have been that the defendants were, in fact. common carriers, although not
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coma Railway and Power Co.,3' a twenty-seven year-old woman

"of refinement and respectability" was accused of being lewd
and unfit to remain on park grounds. In upholding the plaintiff's cause of action for damages," the Supreme Court of

Washington held that regardless of the suit's characterizationff
the park had no right to cause its patron humiliation. An individual, said the court,
[h]as a right to go to any public place, or visit a resort where
the public generally are invited, and to remain there, during all
proper hours, free from molestation by any one, so long as he
conducts himself in a decorous and orderly manner. This right
to freedom from molestation extends not only to freedom from
actual violence, but to freedom from insult, personal indignities, or acts which subject him to humiliation and disgrace; and
any one guilty of violating any of these rights is liable in all
cases for the actual damages suffered therefrom by the injured
person- 36
Similarly, the court in Malczewski v. New OrleansRailway and

Light Co.Y held an amusement park liable for damages for telling the plaintiff to move her improperly parked car "in the offensive and insulting manner adopted by its agent for that
purpose-a manner which could have no other effect than that
of humiliating her in the presence of her friends and of those
near by."' In these jurisdictions, any individual has the right
to go to an amusement park open to the public and to remain
acting as such. Many of the turn-of-the-century parks were begun as a cost-saving
device by street railway companies:
Since these companies were charged a flat monthly rate for their power
something had to be done to increase ridership in the evenings and on Sundays. An early street car owner developed the idea of building an amusement park at the end of the line. It was important to build the parks out in
the boondocks so there was no way to get there except by streetcar.
The idea swept across America, with virtually every town having one or
more street railway company parks.
Jacques, Old Fashioned Walom Park,AMUSOMNT PAMR J., Summer 1983, at 29. See
also Salsbury, Amusement Parks 1890-1930. 7e Evolution of Our Industry, AMusE.
MENT PAK J., Mar. 1980, at 23.
33. 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904).
34. The case was remanded on the amount of damages, which the court found to
be unsupported by evidence. lt at 209, 77 P. at 21.
35. "Whether this suit may be called an action for defamation of character, for
insult, or for personal indignities, or by some other name, we are clear that an actionable wrong was both alleged and proven." Id at 207, 77 P. at 211.
36. Id
37. 156 La. 830, 101 So. 213 (1924).
3. Id at 832 101 So. at 21.
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there free from insult or ridicule.ss
In holding amusement parks to the same high standard as
that of a common carrier, however, the Washington and Louisiana courts are in the minority. In the majority of jurisdictions,
recovery may be had only if the insult or indignity rises to the
level of extreme outrage,40 or if the defendant has knowledge

that the plaintiff is "especially sensitive, susceptible and vulnerable to injury through mental distress at the particular conduct."'4 The latter theory has already been successfully
litigated with respect to the mentally disturbed," sick per-

sons,"s children," and blacks,45 and would seem to apply
equally to insulting and humiliating discrimination aimed at
the disabled; the disabled are equally vulnerable to injury from
such indignities.
Two cases which have been brought under these two theories, however, indicate some difficulty in applying them to dis-

crimination against the disabled. The paraplegic plaintiff in
Parisv. Division of the State CompensationInsurance Fundl
received a letter of reprimand from his employer that contained the statement, "You must realize your job was created
for you because of your handicap."4' 7 Paris argued that this

statement was deliberately included and caused him severe
emotional distress. The court, however, found that the defendant's conduct was insufficiently outrageous to meet the extreme outrage test,43 and refused recovery."
39. One recent incident which may have involved this type of humiliation and
insult involved the conduct of an amusement park employee towards a crippled child.
A costumed character allegedly pulled the crippled child "out of a crowd, danced with
her, and pointed derisively at her deformed leg." Reportedly fearful that the "myth
of character" would be hurt by the incident, the park settled the case. Adler, The
Dianeo Defense, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1983, at 39, 43.
40. See cases cited supra note 30.
41. W. PHOSSm, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 58 (1971).
42. Nickerson v. Hodges, 140 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
43. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit, 70 App. D.C. 188, 105 F.2d 62 (1939); Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599,193 S.F. 458 (1937); Continental
Gas Co. v. Garrett, 173 Misc. 676, 161 N.Y.S. 753 (1935); National Life & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Anderson, 187 Okl. 180, 102 P.2d 141 (1940); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tetirlck, 187 Okl. 37, 89 P.2d 774 (1938).
44. Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956); Korbin v.
Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. App. 1965).
45. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
46. 517 P.2d 1353 (Colo. CL App. 1973).
47. id at 1354.
48. The Colorado Court of Appeals applied the test for extreme outrage found in
REUATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965):
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Four years after Paris,a similar Issue was addressed in Harris v. Jones50 Harris, a speech-disabled worker, had often been
thus causing tremen"maliciously and cruelly ridiculed ...
dous nervousness, [and] increasing the physical defect itself."5 1
In measuring the degree of outrage, the court recognized that
defendant Jones' knowledge of Harris' increased susceptibility
due to his handicap should be taken into consideration. 'The
conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when
the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it
would not be so if he did not know."5 2 The court found it unnecessary, however, to reach this issue, finding that Harris' distress was not sufficiently severe to warrant a verdict in his
favor.5'
It is difficult to tell precisely what factual elements will be
found sufficient to support a finding of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, at least in part because a number of cases
that might produce such a finding are settled out of court due
to fear of potential publicity." Although the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress may, theoretically, provide a
cause of action, antidiscrimination statutes, where they exist,
provide a more certain basis upon which to approach the issue
of park liability for discrimination on the basis of disability.

III
Accommodation
A.

Architectural Accommodation: The Failure of
Antidiscrimination Statutes

Although the antidiscrimination statutes discussed above
prohibit park owners from refusing admission on the basis of
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to

an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
517 P.2d at 1355.
49. le at 155.
50. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 6U (1977).
5L IcLat 562, 380 A.2d at 612.
52. I at 567, 380 Ai2d at 0%5, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tows § 46,

comment f (1965).
53. Id. at 572, 380 A.2d at 617.
54 Adler, 8upm note 39, at 4&
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disability, these statutes have proved to be totally ineffective in
facilitating the physical access to privately owned recreation areas.M This problem is illustrated by Marsh v. Edwards Theatres
Circuit Inc.,M brought under
the antidiscrimination provision
57

of the California Civil Code.

The California statute provides that "physically disabled persons shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members
of the general public" to "places of public accommodation,
amusement or resort. ' Marsh, a quadraplegic, had visited the
defendant's movie theatre with his parents. Before entering
the theatre, Marsh was informed by the theatre manager that
he would have to move from his wheelchair and occupy a regular seat because the fire regulations prohibited anyone from sitting in the aisles.59 Marsh, however, was unwilling to risk
possible injury by being lifted from his wheelchair. 6° The theatre manager offered Marsh the alternative of sitting in front of
the regular seats, a short distance from the screen, which was
55. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Los Angeles, 162 Ca App. 3d 559,209 CaL Rptr. 301
(1984). For a discussion of the difficulties created by architectural barriers and the
legal barriers to having them removed, see generally Achtenberg, Law and the Physically Disabled An Update with ConstitutionalImplications, 8 Sw. L.J. 847 (1976);
Farber, The HandicappedPleadfor Entrance-WillAnyone Answer?, 64 Ky. L.J. 99
(1975);,Note, The Forgotten Minority: The Physically Disabled and Improving their
Physical Environment, 48 CmI.-KENT L REv. 215 (1971); Note, Abroad in the Lan&
Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights Qf the Physically Disabled,61 GEO. L.J. 1501
(1973).
56. 64 Cal. App. 3d 881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976). See also Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 433 N.Y.S.2d 461 (App. Div. 1980). For a
discussion of accessibility in the context of a personal injury action, see Hodges v.
Jewel Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 263, 28 Ill.
Dec. 571, 390 N.E.2d 930 (1979) (entrances to
buildings used by the public "must be considered from the standpoint of that minority
of the public which is mobile but handicapped as well as from the standpoint of those
without any physical handicaps").
57. CAL. Crv. CODE § 54.1 (West 1968).
58. The full text of the statute is as follows:
Blind persons, visually handicapped persons, and other physically disabled
persons shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the
general public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all
common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses,
streetcars, boats or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation,
hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort,
and other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, or state or federal regulation,
and applicable alike to all persons.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1 (West 1968).
59. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
60. IC
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also unacceptable to Marsh."1 No other alternative arrange-

ments were possible because the theatre had not been constructed with special facilities for people in wheelchairs.s
The court rejected Marsh's contention that the theatre
owner, "in constructing and maintaining a building without the
modifications necessary to accommodate persons suffering
from physical handicaps, violated those laws which prohibit discriminations by operators of public accommodations."" The
fact that Marsh was forbidden to sit in the aisles was not considered to be discrimination; the California Civil Code specifically requires disabled persons to conform to those regulations,
such as fire regulations, applicable to all persons.6 '
The court also found that the theatre owner was not required
to make any building modification to accommodate the disabled, because the California statutes requiring such modification e 5 were only prospective in applicationee The court looked
to legislative intent, reasoning that if the legislature had intended building owners to be required to remodel preexisting
buildings to comply with the standard, the legislature would
have indicated this in the architectural barriers statutes.
Finding that this type of economic and policy balancing properly belongs to the legislature," the court was powerless to
hold otherwise. The court concluded:
that the operator of a business of a type enumerated in Civil
Code section 54.1 is not required by the force of that section
aloe to modify its facilities to allow for their use by handicapped persons. That statute requires only that the operator
61. Id.
62. I

63. 1d.
64. Id. at 891, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
65. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4450 (West 1968) (applying to publicly-funded buildings);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFEITrY CODE §§ 19955, 19956 (West 1970) (applying to privately-

funded buildings).
66. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 848.

67. Id.

68. The court found that this decision is within the province of the legislature
The varied and distinctive nature of the numerous handicaps from which
so many people suffer suggests, however, that the problem is one which the
legislative branch of government is uniquely equipped to solve. It is in the
legislative halls where the numerous factors involved can be weighed and
where the needs can be properly balanced against the economic burdens
which of necessity will have to be borne by the private sector of the economy
in providing a proper and equitable solution to the problem.
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open its doors on an equal basis to all that can avail themselves

of the facilities without violation of other valid laws and
regulations.6
B. Architectural Barriers Statutes
It is no comfort that a facility is required to "open its doors on

an equal basis" If the doors do not open wide enough to permit
access by a wheelchair. 70 To remedy this situation, all states

have now enacted architectural barriers statutes specifically
designed to eliminate physical barriers to access.
The applicability of these laws varies from state to state.
Twenty-five states have architectural barriers statutes which

apply only to state and locally funded buildings or facilities.7
Although these laws will have no effect in helping the disabled
gain access to privately-owned recreation areas, the laws will
help them gain access to such facilities as state and municipal

parks.
In twenty-five states and the District of Columbia, however,
architectural barriers statutes apply to all buildings open to the

public.72 Statutory language in six of these states7" seems to
69. Id. at 892, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (emphasis in original).

70. See Goldstein, Getting Your Wheels in the Conference Door & Other Issues Qf
Acces, PARKS & RECREATION, Oct. 1981, at 31.
71. ALA. CODE § 21-4-4 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 35.10.015 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 14-627 (West 1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 4450, 4451 (Deering 1981 & Supp.
1984); CoLO.REV. STAT. § 9-5-102 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6917 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.21 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE § 91-1105 (West Supp. 1984);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 103-50 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-3203 (1977); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 111
1/2, § 3705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:148 (West Supp.
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2701-04 (Supp. 1983-1984); MD. ANN. CODE art.
78A, § 51 (West Supp. 1983); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 16B.61 (West Supp. 1984); MiS&
CODE ANN. § 43-6-101 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 8.610 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-60-201 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 338.180 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275-C:14 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-3-64 (1978) (ramps on highways only);
N.Y. PUB. BLDOS. LAW § 51 (McKlnney Supp. 198&-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.14
(Repl. Vol. 1981) (ramps on highways only); N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-02-19 (West Supp.
1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ti.61, § 11 (West Supp. 1983-1984); RI. GEN. LAws § 37-8-15
(1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 5-14-12 (1980 Rev. Vol.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-291 (West Supp. 1984); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-514 to -521.1 (1979).
Note: Twenty-nine states, rather than 25, are listed above because four states, California, Florida, Louisiana, and Maine, have separate statutes for government buildings (listed above) and for privately-owned public buildings (see infra note 72).
72. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-403 (1974 & Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 19955 (Deering Supp. 1984); CONN.GEN. STAT. § 29-269 (West Supp.
1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1703 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 553.46, 553.48 (West Supp.
1985); IND. ADMM. R. (22-11-5.2)-F90 (Burns 1976); IOwA CODE ANN. § 104A.2 (West
Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1301 (1983); KY. REv. STAT. § 198B.260 (1982);
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specifically single out recreation areas in the list of public accommodations bound by the statute. Even among these states,
however, there is significant variation in the coverage provided
by the statutes. All cover new construction; some also apply to

certain previously erected buildings;' and some require buildings to be made accessible when they are remodeled,78 although
the degree to which they must be made accessible varies.76
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1734 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4591,4592 (1979);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22, § 13A (1980); MICHL COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1352 (West
Supp. 1984-1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1101 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:32-4 (West
Supp. 1983-1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.Ul (Page Supp. 1983); OI. REV. STAT.
§§ 447.210- .280 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1455.1 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-5-260 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-18-201 to -205 (1980
Repl. Vol.); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 601b, §§ 7.01 -.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1321,1322 (1982); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.92.100 (West Supp.
1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-10F-1 to -6 (1984 Repl. Vol.); WMs STAT. § 101.13 (1973 &
Supp. 1983-1984); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-6-501 (West Supp. 1984).
73. The six states are Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, and New
Jersey.
74. Requirements to make previously existing structures accessible may involve
publicly-owned or privately-owned buildings, depending on the state statute. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 553.46(2) (West Supp. 1985) (all buildings must have posts or other strucCODE ANN. § 43-6-101 (1981) (entrance ramps
tures blocking exits removed); MI.
must be added to presently existing buildings); N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-02-19 (Supp.
1983) (all public buildings constructed by the state were required to have been made
accessible by July 1, 1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 447.235 (1973 Repl. Vol.) (all government
buildings for which renovation would not exceed 25% of total cost); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 1455.1 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) (government buildings must conform, with
the exception of sports arenas); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-18-204(b) (1980 Repl. VoL)
(public entertainment buildings must be made accessible).
75. Statutes requiring buildings to be accessible when remodeled may involve
publicly-owned or privately-owned buildings, depending on the state. See CAL. Gov'r
CODE § 4456 (Deering 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19959 (Deering 1984);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6917 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.21 (West Supp. 1985); GA.
CODE § 91-1105 (West Supp. 1982); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 3705 (Smith-Hurd 19831984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1305 (1983 Repl. Vol.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227.305
(Supp. 1976) (repealed 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.148 (West Supp. 1984); Ms.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit.5, §§ 4593,4594,4594-A (1974 & West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 78A, § 51 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22, § 13A (1980); MICL CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 125.1352 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MWN. STAT. ANN. § 16B.61 (West Supp.
1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 8.623 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1101 (1981);
N.L REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-C:14 (West Supp. 1984); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:324, -6

(West Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW §§ 50,51 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.61, § 11 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 447.235 (1983
RepL Vol); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-5-260 (Law. Coop. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 5-14-12 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-18-204(a)(2) (Supp. 1984); TEX REV. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 601b, § 7.09 (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 2629-1 (West Supp.

1983); VA. CODE

§ 2.1-519 (1979 Repl VoL); WAML REV. CODE ANN. § 70.92.110 (West

Supp. 1984-1985); Was STAT. § 101.13 (1973 & Supp. 1983-1984); WYO. STAT. § 164-501

(West Supp. 1984).
76. The Florida statute applies only to "first floor or ground level licensed busi.
now establishments," whereas the California statute requires access to second floor
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These differences sometimes create uncertainties as to the statute's scope, which in turn lead to enforcement difficulties.
The Massachusetts statute is illustrative of this difficulty.
Uncertainties as to the scope of this statute precluded enforcement entirely in Brooks v. ArchitecuralBarriersBoarVL
The
Massachusetts architectural barriers statute 8 mandated that a
building be made accessible to the physically disabled when the
alteration cost of the remodeling equalled or exceeded five per
cent of a building's value. Neither the statute" nor the applicable regulations s° provided a basis for apportioning value when
the structure was a multi-use facility, in which some uses were
regulated and others were not.8 ' When Brooks, who was confined to a wheelchair, sought to have the Architectural Barriers
Board exercise jurisdiction over a newly-remodeled theatre in

such a multi-use building, the Board declined, noting that the
building also housed a restaurant, a bank, and a number of offices. 82 The court upheld the Board's finding that its regulations did not "provide any reasonable means of allocating what
portion" of the building's value constituted the value of the theatre.sS Without knowing that value, it was impossible for the
Board to determine whether the remodeling costs met the five
per cent figure required by statute. A situation analogous to
that in Brooks could arise when a park leases part of its office
building to a food service concessionaire. Whether such a restaurant would be required to be made accessible is uncertain.
Another variation among the states is the nature of the stanbusinesses. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 553.46 (West Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 19955 (Deering Supp. 1984). See also People v. Che, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 123,
197 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (restaurant having all of its public facilities on the second
floor is not exempt from the handicapped accessibility provisions of California law).
77. 14 Mas App. 584, 441 N.E.2d 549 (1982).
78. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22, § 13A (West Supp. 1977). The definitional provision of the statute states:
The following words, as used in this section, shall have the following meanings:
"Alteration," external or internal rehabilitation or renovation for which a
building permit is needed or for which the cost of such rehabilitation or renovation equals or exceeds five per cent of the full and fair cash value of the
building, or, any work determined to be alteration by a state or local building

inpetr.

79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22, § 13A (West Supp. 1977).
80. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 521, § 4.7.2 (1979).
81. 441 N.E.2d at 551.
S2. Id at 553.
83. Id at 55L
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dards which must be met. Most states use some variation of the
standards prescribed by the American National Standards In-

stitute (ANSI)." These standards furnish minimum design criteria for sixteen aspects of buildings and facilities construction,
including doors and doorways, restroom facilities, parking lots,
elevators, drinking fountains, alarms, and telephones.85 ANSI
standards have been adopted by state legislatures in a number
of ways, including incorporating them by reference,s6 prescribing them verbatim, 7 or requiring their consideration by standard-promulgating agencies88
In jurisdictions without applicable architectural barrier laws,
the policies of individual parks become more important. One
amusement park company has expressed its architectural barriers policy as follows: "To design and build new rides, attractions, and facilities to accommodate to the greatest extent
possible all persons, regardless of handicap.' 9 Similar philosophies, if not express policies, have been adopted by many parks.
Epcot Center, a relatively new addition to the Walt Disney
World complex in Orlando, Florida, was designed to provide
maximum access for mobility-impaired persons. 90 As the industry became aware of the special concerns of the disabled,
several parks added accessible entrances to their structures.
One example of this trend is Cedar Point in Sandusky, Ohio.
Cedar Point has created accessible entrances to park buildings
including restaurants and gift shops, added shorter water fountains, and remodeled some restrooms to accommodate disabled
91
patrons.
84. These are the standards approved by the American National Standards Association "for use in the construction of all buildings so that those individuals with permanent physical disabilities might pursue their interests and aspirations, develop
their talents, and exercise their skill." American National Standards Institute, Inc.,
American National Standard Specifications for Making Buildings and Facilities Accessible to and Usable by the Physically Handicapped No. 1171.1 (1961).
85. . I&
86. Note, Access to Buildings and Equal Employment Opportunitiesfor the Dl.
abled; Survey f/State Statute, 50 TEMP. LQ. 1067,1074 (1977).
87. Id at 1074-75.
88. Id at 1076.
89. Prager, supra note 2.
90. WALT DSRNEY WORLD, THE DISABLED GUESTS GUIDEBOOK 1 (1983).
91. Cedar Point, Cedar Point Expands Accessibility for Disabled, Press Release
(1984).
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C. Other Accommodations: Special Equipment and Services
The basic standards required by architectural barriers statutes cover only a few of the physical accoutrements usually
found in parks. Many facilities and attractions provided by
most parks require additional adaptation to be fully functional
for the disabled patron. Certain facilities, such as rides or participatory play areas, may require innovative design techniques
to be accessible. Walt Disney World has constructed many of
its rides to accommodate the mobility-impaired." Similarly,
Busch Gardens, The Old Country, provides accommodations for

wheelchairs on the back of trains. s

A problem arises when special equipment is incorporated
into park design. While current architectural standards cover
commonly-used components such as doorways and elevators,
unusual components have no widely accepted standards. Playgrounds and the more modern participatory play areas illustrate this problem. Few designs for accessible play areas are
available." Similarly, beach areas provided by waterparks can
create difficulties for disabled guests. While some accommodations have been suggested," these suggestions by no means rise
to the level of a standard.
In addition to design accommodation, special services may be
needed. As the trend towards industry accommodation of the
special needs of the disabled has grown, several parks have
made outstanding attempts to provide these services. For example, Company Picnic Company in Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
has instituted a policy requiring that at least one-half of the
personnel assisting on all rides be well-versed in sign language."6 Walt Disney World's list of such special services in92. See the descriptions of 'World of Motion," '"Lsten to the Land," and '_1 Rio
del Tiempo" in WALT DISNEY WORLD, aupra note 90, at 27, 29.
93. Busch Gardens, The Old Country, Information for Visiting Busch Gardens,
The Old Country, for Handicapped Guests, Press Release (1985).
94. One author noted that just as "the environment has been designed for the
'normal' person, so playgrounds have been designed for the 'normal' child." Storage
& Bowers, Ptayround Qf the Future, PARKS & RECREATION, Apr. 1983, at 32. For
some suggested criteria for accessible play elements, see U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND REARC, A PLAYGROUND FOR ALL CIMI)REN (3 vols.) (1976).
95. See US. DEPr. OF THE INTERIOR HERITAGE CONSERVATON AND RECREATON
SERvICE, A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AccESsImLE OUTDOOR RECREATION FAcnr~Irs

(1980).
96. Noting that the park entertained several groups consisting primarily of hear-

ing-Impaired children in 1963, management stated that this effort to raise the number
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cludes cassette tapes which describe the Magic Kingdom area in
terms of smells and sounds to aid the blind,9 and interpretation
of live shows for the deaf." Cedar Point provides braille menus
in certain restaurants."
Because these accommodations are limited only by the park's
imagination, no single set of standards will ever embody all
their desirable components. For this reason, some states have
augmented their architectural barriers statutes with regulations requiring "reasonable accommodation." For example,
West Virginia has adopted a regulation ° ° which makes it unlawful "to refuse to make reasonable accommodations neces-

sary to make any public accommodation accessible to and
functional for handicapped persons." 10 1 Although this regulation's general language applies to a variety of situations, it provides no guidelines to the park owner or operator as to what is
legally required, because there are no standards for determining reasonableness. Without such guidelines, the particular ac-

commodations provided by an individual park will ultimately
depend on the commitment of an owner or operator to the goal
of accommodating the special needs of the disabled.
of signing employees from nine in 1983 to a minimum of thirty-two in 1984 was undertaken to increase the park's accessibility to these hearing-impaired guests. Heller's
Company PicnicOperation Takes Steps to Assist the Handicapped,AMUSEMENT Bus.,
Dec. 31, 1982, at 50, col. 1.
97. S. BNBAUM, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO WALT DINEY WoRLD 29 (1983).
98. 1& at 97. In describing a show performed by Disney's "Kids of the Kingdom"
the guidebook mentions that "the hand motions during the 'Lady America' medley
repeat the words of the songs in sign language for the deaf. The pressing of hands
over the heart signifies 'love."' I
99. Cedar Point, supra note 91.
100. West Virginia Human Rights Commission Interpretive Rules Governing Discrimination on the Handicapped, 7.05 Accessibility and Reasonable Accommodations,
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1 (1982).

101. The regulation reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful to refuse to make reasonable accommodations necessary
to make any public accommodation accessible to and functional for handicapped persons. In determining whether an accommodation is reasonable,
the Commission shall consider (a) The nature and size of the public accom.
modation; (b) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed; (a)
Whether or not the public accommodation is owned, operated, funded, or
used by an agency of government; and (d)The requirements of the West Virginia Law on Handicapped Persons and Public Buildings and Facilities,
W.VA. CODE § 18-10F-let seq.... [A]ny changes or alterations required due
to the failure of the owner, managing agent of the owner (or his lessee or
predecessor in title) to conform to the requirements of said statute will be
considered per se reasonable.
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IV
Safety Considerations
Safety considerations are possibly the most important, and
certainly the most controversial issues affecting the disabled
patron in recreation use. On one side, park owners and operators are understandably worried about an individual's particular physical condition which may be aggravated by a ridelco and
therefore want to restrict access in order to limit potential liability. In contrast, others see such limitations as paternalistic
and find them dlscriminatory.103 Both concerns have merit,
and it is imperative that the legal doctrine developed in this
area balance the traditional tort liability concerns of the recreation industry with newly-evolving civil rights claimed by the
disabled.
An examination of industry concerns over safety and tort liability must include two common law doctrines: the park's duty
to warn its patrons and the assumption of risk defense.
A. The Duty to Warn
The beginning of any tort analysis is the duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff.10' While a few cases express the
view that the duty of the amusement park is the heightened
duty of the common carrier,10 the general rule is that its duty
is one of "due care" or "ordinary care."' 6 In practice this translates into a duty on the part of the park owner or operator to
warn the patron ("invitee") of those defects or dangerous conditions which are not known to the patron and are not observable by him or her."°7
The parameters outlining the extent of this duty have yet to
be defined, however, with respect to the warning required to be
102. Falfss, supro note 4.
103. B. SALUS, supra note 13, at 148. "This is not to say that discrimination occurs
or restrictive laws are passed out of malevolence; quite the contrary. They reflect
paternalistic attitudes and a belief in the need to protect disabled persons from themI"
selves and others and to protect society from their folly....
104. W. PROsSER, supra note 41, at 143.
105. See, ag., Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964) (stage coach
ride); Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 m. App. 2d 337, 87 NE.2d 147 (1949) (ferris wheel);
Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951) (airplane ride).
106. See, ag., Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of AnL,314 So. 2d 626 (FI. 1975)

(Lover's Coach); Wood v. Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 417 Pa. 58, 209 A.2d 268 (1965)
(roller coaster).
107. Jackson v. Kings Island, 58 Ohio St. 2d 357, 390 N..d 810 (1979).
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given to a disabled patron. In the leading case of Jackson v.
Kings Island,108 the Supreme Court of Ohio strongly suggested
that the care owed a disabled patron may differ from that owed
a non-disabled patron. Reasoning that the actions that satisfy
the defendant's duty of ordinary care are based in part on the
recipient of that care, 1°9 the court suggested that a park operator may have a duty to warn a disabled patron of the danger of
a ride which might aggravate his or her condition.110
Charles E. Jackson was eighty-seven years old when he visited Kings Island amusement park with a church group.
Although he had not been on a roller coaster since he was a
youngster, Jackson thought it "would be a thrill to ride one
again"''i and decided to ride the Bavarian Beetle. After a fifteen to twenty minute wait, Jackson entered the ride "with noticeable stiffness, sitting very erect in his seat with arms braced
straight against the safety bar."'
The record indicated that
the ride operators took particular notice of Jackson, partly because of his unconventional dress (a striped suit and tie), and
partly because of his obvious disability. The operators noticed
that Jackson was particularly old, that he walked slowly and
jerkily, and that instead of turning his head when speaking, he
was forced to turn his entire body when addressing those who
spoke to him."'
On one turn during the ride, Jackson said he felt a "pop" in
his neck, followed by significant pain. Although he had difficulty getting out of the car at the end of the ride, he was able to
walk away from the ride. He was immediately hospitalized,
and one week later was forced to undergo surgery for a broken
114
neck.
The trial court sustained the park's motion for summary
judgment, saying there was no duty for the park to warn Jackson. The court of appeals reversed, "concluding that reasonable minds could find the facts necessary to establish a duty on
the part of Kings Island to warn the plaintiff of the nature of
108. I& This case Is discussed briefly in Survey of Ohio Law, 6 OMo N.U.L REv.

885-8 (1979).
109. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 360, 390 N.E.2d at 813.
110. IE
111. M at 357,390 N.2d at 81L.
11L I&
11 I&
114. I& at 356, 390 NE.2d at 812.
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'
The Ohio Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed,
the ride."1
stating:
The question thus raised is whether the operator of this
roller coaster, which was neither improperly designed, defectively constructed nor inadequately maintained, had a duty to
warn the plaintiff that the nature of the ride was such that he
might be injured in the normal course of its operation. The
answer to this question turns upon the presence of facts and
circumstances from which it might be concluded that the operator knew or should have known that the invitee had a disability or infirmity of such a nature that the danger of injury from
the normal operation of the ride could be reasonably foreseen
by the operator by reason of his superior knowledge of the nature of the device.
The trial court, in sustaining defendant's motion for summary judgment, found, as a matter of law, no such superior
knowledge. Based on the record before us, we cannot agree
that the answer is so clearcut.... [TMhere is a legitimate dispute as to exactly what knowledge the defendant could fairly
attribute to this plaintiff, based upon the plaintiff's proven age
and poor physical condition, and the allegedly obstructed view
of the ride. Whether or not there was a duty to warn the invicase must be determined by... [the] factual
tee in11this
6

issues.

The court's analysis clearly presents the elements necessary
to establish a duty to warn: (1) that the park operator knew or
should have known that the invitee had a disability; (2) that the
disability was of the type which could be aggravated by the ride
(based on the operator's superior understanding of the ride);
and (3) that the plaintiff understood the nature of the ride
(based on the knowledge defendant could fairly attribute to the
plaintiff).
The first element, that the defendant knew or should have
known of the existence of a disability, is easily established in
the instance of a visible disability. A patron's advanced age (as
in Jackson), or his use of a wheelchair, back, or neck brace
would clearly be seen by the ride operator. A nonvisible physical or mental disability may present a different question. Many
park operators do, however, post warning signs at the entrances
to those rides which may be dangerous to people with common
hidden conditions such as heart conditions, pregnancy, bad
115. IdE
116. I& at 359-80, 390 NZ.2d at 813.
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backs, or bad necks. 7
Because the question of the operator's superior knowledge of
the ride was not raised in Jackson,118 the court did not discuss
those factors which would show knowledge of the ride's potential to aggravate a particular condition. Relevant factors might
have included the amount of time the ride had been in operation, information on ride forces provided in the manufacturer's
operations manual, and any tests performed by the park."1
The third element of the court's analysis, the knowledge defendant could fairly attribute to the plaintiff, raises the question of the nature of the knowledge the plaintiff must possess.
It is clear that the plaintiff must know more about a ride than
its general nature, as the plaintiff in Jackson admitted such
knowledge.'m The court in Jackson considered both Jackson's
general knowledge of roller coasters and his allegedly obstructed view of the ride in determining what he knew of the
ride's operation. 21 However, from the court's phrasing of the
issue,'2 it seems that the relevant knowledge is plaintiff's
knowledge of the effect of the ride on someone with his particular disability.
The Jackson court's analysis of the park owner's duty to
117. Prager, supra note 2. See also Woolbrlght v. Six Flags Over Ga., 172 Ga. App.
41, 321 S.E.2d 787 (1984).
118. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 360, 390 N.E.2d at 813.
119. Cedar Point, for example, has done an extensive examination of each ride in
the park. Their disabled visitors' guidebook specifies:
We've developed our Ride Admission Policy in consultation with the designers of each ride, a blodynamics engineer and a rehabilitation specialist.
Our prime consideration is the ability of each person to endure the dynamics
of a ride without risk of injury to that person or other riders.
CDAR POINT, GUIDE FOR THE DISABLED 2 (1984).
Additionally, the park held a seminar for its personnel on the needs of the disabled
in which doctors discussed "the different types of disabilities, examined the relationship of motion on the body, and explained the ride policies for each of the park's 57
rides." Cedar Point, supra note 91.
120. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 357, 390 N.E.2d at 811. The plaintiff stated he "was generally
aware of the action of a roller coaster." Id.
121. I& at 360, 390 N.E.2d at 813.
122. This inference is based on the court's language regarding "what knowledge
the defendant could fairly attribute to this plaintiff based upon [his] proven age and
poor physical condition." 58 Ohio St. 2d at 360, 390 N.E.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
Although the reference to the advanced age of the plaintiff may have been a reference to a decreased ability to comprehend, no such assumption can be made from the
possession of a physical disability. It seems more likely that the court was concerned
with Jackson's ability to comprehend the specific risk to himself; that is, did he pos-

sess sufficient knowledge to evaluate how the ride would effect someone with his
particular "poor physical condition."
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warn its patrons of risks associated with particular rides should
prove useful to any park drafting such warnings. Because the
purpose of the duty to warn is to eliminate the "disparity between the proprietor's and the patron's knowledge of the dangerous 'condition,"'n the warning must contain sufficient
information to alert the particular patron for whom the ride is
dangerous. As mentioned above, many parks routinely warn
patrons of rides dangerous to pregnant women or persons with
common disabilities.'2 Because of the number and diversity of
disabilities, as well as the relatively small proportion of riders
with any given one, some parks have taken a different approach to warning by providing special booklets specifically for
the disabled.=
The Disabled Guest's Guidebook prepared by Walt Disney
World is an excellent example of the type of warning and
safety information which should be presented to visitors. For
example, the discussion of Frontier Land's "Big Thunder
Mountain Railroad" states:
NOTE: Handicapped guests riding this attraction should be
able to walk or be carried short distances. Guests required to
wear back, neck or leg braces will be unable to experience this
attraction.
SIGHT-IMPAIRED GUESTS: A sight-impaired guest must
be accompanied by a member of his or her party or request
that a host or hostess accompany him or her. This attraction is
not recommended for leader dogs.
NOTE: There is a minimum height requirement for this
attraction.128

Such information not only serves to help the park meet its
duty to warn the visitor of the possible dangerous condition relating to his or her particular disability, but also provides the
visitor with the information needed to make an informed decision whether to participate in a particular ride.m Additionally,
printing such information may preclude potentially embarassing confrontations between a ride operator and a patron concerning a particular ride.ms
123. I at 359, 390 N.E.2d at 812.
124. Prager, supra note 2.

125. IM
126. WALT DMNs
WORLD, supra note 90, at 22.
127. See itnr notes 129-169 and accompanying text.
128. Jack Falfas, Cedar Point's Director of Park Operations, stated the problem
this wayr "It's not totally feasible to permit every individual on every ride," because
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Assumption of Risk

Closely connected with the duty to warn is the affirmative
defense of assumption of risk. Unfortunately, the doctrine is
not very clear when applied to specific cases, and is often confused with contributory negligence.'2 In the area of amusement ride liability, however, the elements necessary for
assumption of risk have been clearly spelled out. In Russo v.
The Range, Inc.1m and Amusement Slides Corp. v. Lehman,131
two theories of this affirmative defense are presented.
"Express assumption of risk" occurs when "the plaintiff expressly . .. agree[s] in advance that the defendant is under no
obligation of care for the benefit of the plaintiff, and shall not
be liable for the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be negligent."'1 A second theory, "implied assumption of
risk," applies when no contractual relationship is created, but
when the assumption of risk can be inferred from the plaintiff's
conduct."-' Several questions commonly arise: (1) when has a
contract or express agreement been created? (2) what conduct
is required for a finding of implied assumption of risk? (3)
must the plaintiff have been aware of any particular risk? and
(4) does either of these situations free the defendant from all
duty to the plaintiff?
1.

Express or ContractualAssumption of Risk

The parties may attempt to form a contract or an express
agreement by having the disabled patron sign an agreement
upon entering the park stating that, as a condition of access, he
or she agrees to assume the risk of injury from the rides. While
this solution to park liability is often mentioned, no legal precesome rides may be dangerous for certain persons. Park policy is to 6ave disabled patrons visit the park office for a discussion of policies concerning individual rides, in
order to avoid "stressful, offensive, or embarassing" moments when individuals are
'lged out" at the rides. "Our policy is designed to alleviate problems, not create
them " Falfas, mupm note 4.
129. See W. PROSsx, supra note 41, at 439. "[A]ssumption of risk has been used by

the courts in several different senses, which have been lumped together under one
name, usually without realizing that any differences exist, and certainly with no effort to make them clear." I&

130. 76 1. App. 3d 236, 395 N.E.2d 10 (1979).
131. 217 Va. 815, 232 S.E.2d 805 (197.
132. W. PRoIm, up,u note 41, at 442. This is also known as "primary"assump-

tion of risk.
133. 1& at 445.
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dent as to the validity of the waivers has been established.""
One difficulty with this solution is that, in those instances
where the statute embodies an equal protection clause,1 sw requiring only disabled patrons to sign the waiver as a condition
of access may be in violation of a state's antidiscrimination statute. A second problem is that courts often look with disfavor
on such agreements, construing them narrowly against the
park, 6 or declaring them void for reasons of public policy, especially when the park in question is part of a municipal park
system or other governmental body.1"
Arguments have also been made that a contract whereby the
patron assumes the risk is created when the patron accepts a
ticket with this warning and/or reads a sign warning of the possibility of danger. M The courts, however, have not fully accepted this argument. In Russo v. The Range, Inc.,"' plaintiff
Russo sued for injuries sustained on a "giant slide" ride at defendant's amusement park. Russo had bought a ticket for the
ride, on the reverse side of which was printed: "the person us-

ing this ticket so assumes all risk of personal injury." 40 Russo
admitted that he read and understood both the ticket and a sign
reading "slide at own risk . .. not responsible for personal injury.' 141 The court found that there was a "bargain for the express contractual waiver of liability," but as it did not result in a
written contract,"42 the validity and extent of the waiver must
be determined from the intent of the plaintiff."'
2. Assumption of Risk Implied From Conduct
A second theory of the affirmative defense of assumption of
risk is that a plaintiff may assume the risk through his or her
conduct.'" In Amusement Slides Corp. v. Lehman,1" the
134. Davis, StandardizedRide Regs Discussed in Ride Session, AMUSEMENT Bus.,

Dec. 10, 1983, at 14, col. 4.
135. See, eg., CAL. Civ. CODE § 541 (Deering Supp. 1984).
136. O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1982).
137. See Kozowski, CourtsFrown on Liability Release Agreenents, PARKS & RECREATION, June 1982, at 48.
138. Russo v. The Range, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 236, 239, 395 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1979).

139. IM
140. I at 237, 395 N.E.2d at 12.
141. Id.
142. I& at 239, 395 NZ.2d at 13.

143. IM
144. W. PRoSSER, supra note 41, at 445.
145. 217 Va. 815, 232 SX.2d 803 (1977).

No. 3]

DISABLED PATRONS OF AMUSEMENT PARKS

493

Supreme Court of Virginia applied the elements necessary for a
finding of assumption of risk implied from conduct. James
Lehman and a companion had been riding various amusement
devices in Norfolk's Ocean View Park when they came to the
"Sky Slide" ride. While watching others ride the slide, Lehman
saw a child fall and hurt his arm. Lehman's companion decided
not to ride the slide at all due to a bad back, 141 but Lehman
chose to ride. On his way to the top of the ride, Lehman observed and read two large signs posted near the base of the slide
which read:
NOTICE!
Keep your Hands in Your Lap Until You COME TO A COMPLETE STOP. Do not TRY TO STOP YOURSELF. Do Not
Turn around while GOING DOWN Slide. Do Not Play or
Show Off While GOING DOWN Slide. If Two Person [sic] Are
Sliding On One
Mat One person Must Be Between The Legs Of
147
The Other.

and
ATTENTION
Water Is Used To Control The Speed Of The Ride. If You
Get Slightly Wet, We Are Sorry. IT'S FOR YOUR
SAFETY.148
As Lehman continued to ascend the stairway, he heard the following tape recording being played continuously through a
loudspeaker system:
For those who are about to ride the thrilling Sky Slide,
please listen and follow instructions very closely:
When you reach the top of the slide the operator will assist
you and tell you exactly what to do. As you come down the
slide lean slightly forward and hold onto the sack and do not
let go for any reason. Do not turn around or rock back and
forth as you are coming down the slide. Follow all the instructions very closely and have a wonderful slide.1
Just before letting go of the side, Lehman was warned by an
operator that the slide had just been waxed,e° but Lehman testified that he had not thought anything of it."'
146. Id. at 816-17, 232 S.E.2d at 803-04.
147. Id at 817, 232 S.E.2d at 804.
148. Id Evidence was presented that the plaintiff did not see a third sign, placed at

a different location, which read "If You Are Over Twenty-Five This Ride Ain't Your
Thing." Id
149. Id at 81S, 232 SE2 at 804.

150. Id at 818, 232S
151. Id

1 at S0
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Once on the descent, Lehman noticed he was moving at an
excessive speed, but that no employee squirted water on the
slide as per the safety precaution posted.02 Lehman was subsequently injured when he flew over the last "hump" on the slide
and impacted at its base."
"Assumption of the risk is venturousness and has two requirements."J' The first is that the action is a voluntary, willing one, resulting from no exigent circumstances.m Thus, the
buying of the ticket and the act of getting onto the ride would
alone be sufficient to establish voluntariness.

3. Undersandigof the Risk Assumed
The defendants in both Russo and Lehman failed to establish
the second requirement of the affirmative defense of assumption of risk. that the plaintiffs understood the risk involved.
The Illinois court found that the validity and extent of Russo's
waiver was dependent on his understanding of the specTzc risk
he was undertaking. The court noted:
Essential to [assumption of risk] situations is specific knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the risk he is about to be
subjected to. As noted ...this makes the test for the assumption of risk a fundamentally subjective one. While a plaintiff
cannot elude application with protestations of ignorance in the
face of obvious danger, the defendant cannot escape liability
unless he proves that the plaintiff appreciated the specific risk
which caused the injury.15
Here, even though Russo had watched several persons descend
the slide, he claimed no knowledge that the slide would cause
him "to fly in the air. 157 Because the record did not describe
the normal operation of the slide, the court could not evaluate
whether this occurrence was one normally accompanying the
ride. It was therefore impossible for the court to rule as a matter of law that Russo "had knowledge of the particular risk
which resulted in his injury.""l
This general principle that assumption of risk does not preclude liability when the risk incurred is other than that as152. Xd

153. IC
15
155.
156.
157.

IM at 819, 232 S.E2d at 805.
Id at 821-22, 232 SX.2d at 806-07 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
76 MlLApp. 3d at 238-39, 395 N.E.2d at 13 (citations omitted).
ISdat 239, 395 N.E.2d at 1M.

158. I&
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sumed'59 is also illustrated in Lehman. As noted earlier,

Lehman had expected the slide attendant to squirt water on
the slide to slow his descent' 6 0 The appellate court, affirming
the trial court's judgment holding the park liable, said:
It is true plaintiff assumed the risk of injury resulting from a
ride down a steep incline at a controlled yet rapid speed. But
plaintiff did not assume the hazard of injury due to the negligent failure of defendant's employee to spread water on the
waxed slide when plaintiff began to accelerate to an excessive
and dangerous speed. This is especially true when, as here,
plaintiff had been advised by the sign that for the customer's
safety, water was used to control the speed of the slide. From
the explicit instructions broadcast by the signs and over the
loudspeaker, the plaintiff was justified in believing that the
slide was safe, provided the instructions were followed. He followed the instructions, yet he was injured when defendant's
employee was too busy and too tired to discharge his responsibility of decelerating plaintiff with water.' 61
Clearly, when the plaintiff agrees to certain risks he does not
agree to others. He does not assume the risk, for example, of
negligence so severe as to be called willful, wanton, reckless, or
gross.

162

Generally, the amusement park patron is said to assume the
"known risks" of the ride. 6 3 Following the Jackson reasoning
regarding the specific concerns of the disabled, a question of
159. W. PROSSER, supra note 41, at 447.
160. See upra note 152 and accompanying text.
161. 217 Va. at 819, 232 S.E.2d at 805 (emphasis omitted).
162. W. PROSSER, supra note 41, at 444. See generally O'Connell v. Walt Disney
World Co., 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1982).
163. Sullivan v. Ridgeway Constr. Co., 236 Mass. 75, 127 N.E. 543 (1920); Murphy v.
Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929); Lumsden v. L.A.
Thompson Scenic Ry., 130 App. Div. 209, 114 N.Y.S. 421 (1909). See Note, Torta"Assumption qf Risk Injury to Patrons f Amusement Parks, 15 CoRNELL L.Q. 132
(1929).
Recent scholarship, however, casts doubt on whether the patron "knows" of any
risk. Instead, patrons may expect the ilusion of risk coupled with perfect safety.
Commercial recreation entrepreneurs have led in creating, and profiting
from, the illusion of the risk experience. Theme parks are a primary example. Roller coaster and log rides, carefully engineered for safety, nevertheless leave participants with the thrill of being on the edge of danger. Even
more mellow experiences provide paying guests the opportunity of adventure
climbing in towering tree houses, swinging on suspension bridges, or riding
make-believe rafts through an adventurous storyland recalling the real and
fantasied risks of long ago.
Rigglns, A Risk Continuum:Stateglee for Risk Progrmmino PARKS & RECREATION,
Jan. 1983, at 82, 82-83.
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fact would arise as to whether the particular individual realized
the possible effect of the ride's forces or operation on his or her
particular disabling condition.'" Some risks are indeed obvious. Certainly Lehman's companion, who chose not to slide because of her back problem, had assessed the risk in relation to
her condition. Where the specific risk is obvious, a jury may
find that even without a specific warning, the disabled rider
knew of its equally obvious effect on his or her condition.
A different situation arises when a disabled plaintiff has a
condition that keeps him or her from appreciating the particular risk, even though that risk may be obvious to a non-handicapped person. A blind person, for example, may be unable to
gauge the speed or jerkiness of a ride due to his inability to
watch the ride in operation.16 ' A person with a mental disability may be unable to evaluate completely the factors involved
in making the decision to ride. 1' 6 Both of these situations
would present instances in which the plaintiff would not have
the subjective knowledge necessary for a finding of assumption
of risk.
Where the condition is not obvious to the average person,
other considerations may arise. One such consideration is contributory negligence: even though the plaintiff did not know of
the dangerous condition, he or she should have known of the
condition, or it could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. This situation may arise where the dangerous condition
might have been observed by watching the ride in operation,
but the plaintiff neglected to do so. However, contributory negligence is not at issue where the danger is one peculiar to the
disabling condition and is within the superior knowledge of the
ride operator. Another consideration is that under certain circumstances the plaintiff may be held to have assumed the risk.
This occurs when the dangerous condition is not obvious to an
ordinary observer, but the plaintiff has some special knowledge
of the danger. Such knowledge might include a prior ride on
the same device,'8 or some special background in engineering
164. See auwu note 122 and accompanying text.
165. His riding may, however, be contributorily negligent, as not up to the standard
of care of the reasonable blind person in not asking for more information. See generally tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World. The Disabledin the Law of Torts, 54
CAWF. L. REV. 841 (1966).
166. See Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. 1965) (contributory negligence
and assumption of risk attributable to mentally disabled).
167. Schmidt v. Fontaine Ferry Ent., 319 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1958).
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or medicine.
In many instances, these problems may be avoided by providing a warning of the type discussed earlier. Once the warning
has been given, one of two analyses is possible: (1) there has
been no breach of duty, so there is no need to reach the assumption of risk defense, ise or (2) the warning has placed the condition in the category of "known risk," one capable of being
assumed 6 9
C. Policy Considerations
Some commentators suggest that having the guest assume
the risk is not as desirable as other options. These options indude: making the rides safer by using special harnesses or
other safety devices; reducing ride forces; eliminating evacuation, loading and unloading problems; and designing rides with
special consideration paid to the needs of the disabled.170 Because there is still a great deal of research to be done in these
areas, and because, in specific instances, these changes may be
either prohibitively expensive or impossible, a great deal of attention has been paid to the power or duty of the park owner or
operator to exclude disabled persons from rides.171 It is clear
from statutory, regulatory, and case law that the owner or operator must take into consideration several factors in making a
decision regarding access restrictions.
One of these factors examines whether state antidiscrimination statutes may require the park owner or operator not to exclude a disabled person from a ride.17 2 In some states,
regulations have been promulgated which purport to grant the
park the ability to discriminate in some instances. New Jersey
has adopted a regulation 78 that permits the owner to refuse access to a passenger whose "health or physical condition makes
it unsafe for him to use the ride,"'' 4 although the regulation
168. Jackson v. Kings Island, 58 Ohio St. 2d 357, 359 n.2, 390 N.E.2d 810, 812 n.2
(1979).
169. Russo v. The Range, Inc., 76 M. App. 3d at 238, 395 N.E.2d at 12-13. Only the
first of these two theories would be applicable to the mentally disabled. See Lynch,
396 S.W.2d at 272. See also Note, supra note 163, at 136.

170. Prager, supra note 2.
171.
172.
173.
174.

I&
See 8upmu text accompanying notes 1244.
N.J. ADMN. CODE tlt. 12, § 195-5.10 (1981).
IE The full text of the regulation is as follows:

Phasenge Conduct. (a) The owner shall have the right to refuse any member
of the public admission to a ride if his bearing or conduct will endanger him-
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does not specify how this determination is to be made. The
Texas regulation 7 5 clearly places the determination in the
"owner's or operator's opinion."1" 6 Such regulations, however,
must be construed in pan matenia with the antidiscrimination
statutes. For this reason, restrictions should be limited to those
rationally required for safety. Six Flags Amusement Park Corporation has expressed this concern as a policy "[t]o offer each
guest access to all rides unless the safety of the guest, other
These safety
guests and/or park employees is jeopardized."'
restrictions should be based on research, evidence, and demonstrated experience. After DeFini v. Home Lines Agency,
Inc.,178 it is clear that courts will look closely at the underlying
evidence to support restrictions, and will reject spurious safety
claims based primarily on a paternalistic attitude towards the
disabled patron.17 '
It is also clear that the evidence used to justify even obvious
safety rationales is subject to controversy. Recreation ethicist
Gerald Fain has posed several questions which he feels the recreation industry must answer to establish an ethical framework
for its patrons' "right to risk." These questions include such
issues as: if an activity involves risks to physical safety, "who
has the responsibility (based on what data) to stop the involvement? How is it determined when the right to risk for one individual interferes with the rights of another? On what basis is a
particular action judged to be over-protective or prudent?""lso
As with most ethical considerations, these issues present no
clear-cut answers and are likely to be the underlying basis for
litigation over ride restrictions based on safety for quite some
time.
self or other members of the public. (b) The owner shall have the right to
refuse admittance to any ride if the intended passenger's health or physical
condition makes it unsafe for him to use the ride.
175. Amusement Ride Safety Inspection and Insurance Act, § 7, TEL INM CODE
ANN. art. 21.53 (Vernon 1985).
176. 1& The full text of section seven is as follows: 'The owner or operator of an
amusement ride may deny entry to the ride to any person if in the owner's or operator's opinion the entry may jeopardize the safety of the person who desires to enter or

of the safety of other patrons of the amusement ride."
177. Prager, aupra note 2.
178. CPD-38522-75 (N.Y. Exec. Dept., Div. of Human Rights, 1976). For a discussion of this case, see 8upra text accompanying notes 25-28.

179. Id
180. Fain, To Protect the Publi'c A Matter of Ethic, PARKS & RECREAMON, Dec.
1983, at 50, 5&
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Balanced against these concerns is the finding by some courts
that parks may be negligent if they do not restrict access in certain circumstances. In Thomas v. Pacheco 81 the Supreme
Court of Colorado held that evidence, including evidence that
the "Scrambler" ride generated considerable centrifugal force,
supported a finding that the owner and operator of the ride
were negligent in allowing two children to ride unattended.
Seven-year-old Loretta Lou Pacheco, riding only with a sevenyear-old companion, was severely and permanently disabled
when she fell from defendant's "Scrambler." Evidence was
presented that the children were not strapped into their seats,
which were designed to hold three average-sized adults.182 The
children's feet dangled above the floor; thus, they were free to
be buffeted forward, backwards, and sideways on the seat.
Although Pacheco tried to hold on, the forces of the ride were
too strong for her, and she fell off the ride and was injured.
The court held that the park was negligent in permitting the
children to ride alone without special safety devices, and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of Pacheco's injuries.lss The court relied on the reasoning in an earlier case,
Brown v. Columbia Amusenent Co.,'" which indicated that if
children were not altogether prohibited from riding (one possible option for the park), special steps must be taken to protect

them:
[I]f the operator of such a device [dangerous to children] ...
does not prohibit such children from riding thereon, ordinary
care should dictate that he take such steps as are necessary for
their protection, such as promulgating and enforcing rules
compelling a parent or other responsible persons to ride with
them and care for them; provide straps for fastening them on,
or provide attendants ... who will be vigilant ....
I
Pacheco has implications for similar policies concerning the
disabled. One of the primary reasons the ride was unsafe for
the children was that their feet did not reach the floor of the
ride, so they were unable to brace themselves.1m Certainly, this
same problem could arise with a paraplegic. A ride designed to
accommodate a specific center of gravity may be dangerous for
181.
182.
183.
1K4
185.
186.

163 Colo. 170, 429 P.2d 270 (1967).
Id at 173, 429 P.2d at 272.
Id at 174, 429 P.2d at 272-73.
91 Mont. 174, 6 P.2d 874 (1931).
Id at 190, 6 P2d at 878.
163 Colo. at 173, 429 P.2d at 272.
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someone whose center varies from that specification.u A second concern was the children's young age and their ability to
"understand, appreciate, and avoid" the dangers of the ride.1 M
As noted above, this issue can arise generally in the situation of
a mentally disabled patron, s or more specifically in the issue
of the ride's effect on a particular physical disability.1 °
D.

Recommendations

Because of the question of paternalism arising from ride restriction, the legal considerations concerning the application of
antidiscrimination laws, and the responsibilities of the park towards guest safety, ride access, and restriction policies, must be
carefully designed. One possibility is to limit the operator's
ability to limit access to instances in which the risk of injury is
substantially increased because of the particular disability, and
to instances in which the patron is unable to appreciate the risk
due to age or mental disability. Where the increase of risk is
slight or negligible, the patron should be warned of the possibility. This balancing approach seems to be that taken by Walt
Disney World, where persons required to wear back, neck, or
leg braces are unable to ride those attractions with high ride
forces but are only warned of lesser risks on other rides.
This use of warning/assumption of risk as a buffer zone between restricted access and complete access protects against paternalistic attitudes, and reflects society's increasing
recognition that the physically disabled are capable of making
their own decisions. In fact, because a person may be physically
disabled for any number of reasons, he or she may often be in a
better position than the park operator to determine whether
the warning specifies problems for his or her particular

disability.
There is some argument that the assumption of risk defense
should be limited by public policy when the device is unreasonably dangerous. " 1 The unreasonableness standard is extremely
difficult to measure in the area of amusement rides, however,
because the same forces which represent a danger to the dis187. Falfas, 8upra note 4.

188. 163 Colo. at 174, 429 P2d at 273.
189. Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. 1965).

190. Jackson v. Kings land, 58 Ohio St 2d 357, 390 N.E.2d 810 (1979).
191. Keeton, Aumption of Risk in ProductsLabigii Caaes 22 LA. L REV. 122,
153 (1961).
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abled person provide the excitement that is the very reason for
taking the ride. Although there is no policy reason for not
eliminating safety problems in unloading, loading, and emergency evacuation, or for not fitting ride vehicles with special
restraints, substantially reducing all ride forces would be unfair
to the non-disabled patron.1 92 The thrill of a fast-moving
amusement ride was described by Justice Musmanno in his dissent to Wood v. Conneaut Lake Park Inc.:lse
A roller coaster ride is one of the fond, nostalgic memories of
childhood. There is that first momentous, awesome ascent up
the steeply inclined track, then, at its peak, the sudden, heartstopping precipitous descent, then another sensation-charged
climb, and once more a breath-taking fall with nerves tingling,
hair flying, amid joyous shouts and laughter, then the racing
over a straightaway which slams into a curve, the exciting
careening around the bend, then a rapid succession of rocketing ups-and-downs, whirlwind dips, more adventuresome
curves through leaf-flowering trees and fragrant foliage, and
then the happy exhaustion from thrills, fun, and uninhibited
1
excitement. 9
Rather than eliminating such an important part of America's
shared memories for the past century, a simple alternative is
for a park to provide a continuum of activities. This continuum
could include rides for thrill-seekers as well as gentler rides,
shows, or other attractions for those unable (or unwilling) to be
quite so venturous.se

V
Conclusion
There is currently no consistent legal policy regarding access
for the disabled to privately-owned recreation areas such as
amusement parks. The major reason is a lack of law in some
states. Because there is little federal protection in this area,19e
it is crucial that states legislate civil rights protection prohibit192. See Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 135 N.E.2d 708 (1956) (although lighting a
summer camp would make it safer for everyone, it would be unfair to those seeking
the adventure of living closer to nature).
193. 417 Pa. 58, 209 A.2d 268 (1965).
194. ld. at 65, 209 A.2d at 272.
195. Prager suggests this among other methods for making the park visit more
pleasant for the disabled. Other suggestions include special rates and a standard
method of handling guest complaints Prager, 8pm note 2.
196. See auprm note 12.
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ing discrimination against the disabled by places of public accommodation, amusement, or resort. Although certain states
provide a great deal of such protection, others provide no help.
In these latter states, antidiscrimition statutes must be made
the first priority.
Architectural barriers statutes must be made applicable to
both privately-owned and publicy-owned buildings and recreation areas open to the public if they are to help disabled persons
gain access to amusement parks. The incorporation of ANSI
standards into these regulations would provide such necessary
facilities as barrier-free parking, pathways, and building entrances; accessible restrooms and telephones; and visual alarm
systems.
The special functions performed by amusement parks, however, make these statutes only a partial solution to the problem
of providing access for the disabled. Although regulations providing for reasonable accommodation to make facilities accessible to and functional for disabled persons may cover the
specialized services of amusement parks, these regulations are
extremely vague. An alternative method of providing for access to nontraditional areas would be to leave the issue to the
discretion of the individual park, or to the park industry association (IAAPA). Although this approach has the disadvantage
of not providing legal redress for the park's failure to accommodate, it does keep the park out of an extremely uncertain legal
situation. This disadvantage is mitigated by the ANSI standards otherwise incorporated in the architectural barriers statutes. These standards would provide access to shops, theatres,
restaurants, and similar facilities within the park. Left to the
discretion of the park would be such situations as ride cars or
gondolas, participatory play areas, or water areas not covered
1
by ANSI standards. 7
The safety policies of a park concerning ride restrictions are
the most sensitive issues. Where safety is concerned, a balance
of civil rights and liability issues suggests that disabled persons
should be permitted on as many rides as possible, with a warning given where it seems possible the ride will aggravate a particular disability. Exclusion should be used only where there is
197. Problems concerning ride accessibility are not the same as those concerning
restricted ride access for safety reasons. A dark ride, for example, could be perfectly
safe for a disabled patron, but might be inaccessible because wheelchairs do not fit in
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a seriously increased risk of harm due to the disability, or
where an individual is unable to appreciate the risk due to age
or mental disability. In instances in which a state is considering
adopting regulations concerning the ability of a park owner or
operator to exclude certain persons from rides, care must be
taken to word the regulation in such a way that it does not conflict with antidiscrimination statutes.
Before mandating access to all rides, or defining "reasonable
accommodation" to include reducing ride forces, law-makers
should take into consideration the belief of some observers that
recreation professionals "have been straightjacketed by legislation, policies, and lawsuits" into creating "bland" recreation environments.1 " Instead of legislation mandating that all forces
be decreased, legislators should encourage parks to provide a
continuum of attractions, with activities suitable for the handicapped and non-risk-oriented patron, as well as more exhilarating thrill rides for the adventurous. Such a combination of
legislation and park policy can create a welcoming
environment.

198. See Rgglma eup

note 163, at 8.

